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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN WILLIAMS and KYLE 
WILLIAMS , 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
MALUALANI B. HOOPIIANA, 
Trustee of the MALUALANI B. 
HOOPIIANA TRUST, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to § 7 8-2-2(4) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Were the findings of the trial court clearly erroneous? 
2. Were the conclusions of the trial court correct? 
3. What constitutes abandonment of an easement acquired by 
written grant of record? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. To successfully challenge the trial court's findings, 
the appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
1 
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trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against 
the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly 
erroneous. Ohline Corp, v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah 
App. 1993) 
2. The appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions 
of law for correction of error. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
(a) Utah Code Annotated § 54-4-11 and § 54-3-20, require a 
railroad corporation to make connections and to provide services 
by switches and spurs upon application of any person who is a 
shipper or receiver of freight. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiffs-appellants, Steven and Kyle Williams ("Williams") 
commenced this action by a Complaint to Quiet Title to commercial 
and industrial property at 737 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, claiming that a written easement appurtenant to the tract 
of the defendant-appellee, Malualani B. Hoopiiana ("Hoopiiana") 
had been abandoned. (R 2-5). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court. 
After a full bench trial and review of briefs filed by both 
parties, the trial court by telephone conference recited its 
decision (R 100) and subsequently made and entered Findings of 
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Factf Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Decree dismissing the 
Williams* complaint with prejudice and decreeing that Hoopiiana 
owns a perpetual easement for a spur track over Williams• 
property pursuant to an agreement of February 8, 1947 creating a 
right-of-way, which has not been abandoned and continues in full 
force and effect. (R 101-108). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Hoopiiana submits the following excerpt from the trial 
court's Findings of Fact as being the facts of the case: 
1. The [Williams] are residents of Salt Lake County and are 
owners of certain real property located at 737 South 300 West, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and more particularly described as 
follows: 
Lot 5, Block 23, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, as is 
recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
2. The Defendant, [Hoopiiana], is the owner of the 
following described tract which adjoins the [Williams'] property 
on the east thereof: 
West one-half of Lot 6, Block 12, Plat "A", Salt Lake 
City Survey, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. On or about April 6, 1917, the then owner of Lot 5, 
referred to above, Theodore T. Burton and Florence Burton, his 
wife, granted to the Oregon Shortline Railroad Company a railroad 
easement for a right-of-way for the construction, operation and 
maintenance of a railroad spur that traversed through all of Lot 
5, as per Exhibit "A" offered and received in evidence. 
4. A condition of the said Easement of April 6, 1917, 
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granted by the previous owner of Lot 5 was that: 
If at any time the said spur track or any portion 
thereof shall be removed from the above-described landf 
then and in that event this conveyance shall become 
null and void and have no effect between the parties 
hereto or their successors, or assigns, as to such 
trackage so removed. 
5. Subsequently, on or about February 8, 1947, the then 
owner of Lot 5, Florence M. Burton, granted to the then owner of 
the following real property: 
The West 1/2 of Lot 6, Block 12, Plat "A" Salt Lake 
City Survey. 
a right-of-way for a spur track in perpetuity. The right-of-way 
was granted for the exclusive use of the real property as a "spur 
track" and could not be extended to any other property adjacent 
to the west half of Lot 6, Block 12, Plat "A", Salt Lake City 
Survey. Said Easement of February 8, 1947 was received into 
evidence as Exhibit B. 
6. The successor-in-interest to Edward L. Burtonf the 
Grantee of the right-of-way for a railroad spur over the 
[Williams] tract is [Hoopiiana] who is the current owner and in 
possession of certain real property at about 349 West 700 South, 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah and is the West 
1/2 of Lot 6, Block 12f Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey. 
7. On or about July 6, 1983, the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, the Lessee of the railroad spur across Lot 5 notified 
the [Williams], who are now the owners of Lot 5, of their Notice 
of Intent to Terminate the Easement of April 6, 1917, that was 
originally granted to the railroad company for the creation of 
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the railroad spur track. 
Then, on December 17, 1987, the Union Pacific Railroad for 
and in behalf of the Oregon Shortline Railroad Company, recorded 
a Disclaimer releasing all of their rights, title and interest to 
the Easement of April 6, 1917. Said Disclaimer of December 17, 
1987, was granted based upon the original terms of the railroad 
spur Easement of April 6, 1917, which stated: 
If at any time the said spur tracks, or any portion 
thereof shall be removed from the above-described land, 
then in the event this conveyance shall become null and 
void and if no effect between the parties thereto or 
their successors or assigns as to such trackage so 
removed. 
No such termination provision was contained in [Hoopiiana*s] 
easement of February 18, 1947, which by its terms was stated to 
be a perpetual right-of-way of a spur track crossing the property 
now owned by the [Williams], with the right of the servient owner 
to change the location on its tract so long as the right-of-way 
as changed will continue to permit the spur track to continue to 
serve [Hoopiiana's] property entering at the same place as the 
existing spur then entered the dominant tract. 
8. [Hoopiiana] last used the spur track in 1983. 
Subsequently in 1983, [Williams] erected a gate at the entrance 
of the spur at 700 South Street, placed a lock on the gate and 
provided a key to the gate to [Hoopiiana]. 
9. In 1988 the Union Pacific Railroad removed that portion 
of the spur in 700 South Street which attached to the trunk line 
on 400 West Street thereby disconnecting the spur at the vicinity 
of [Williams'] tract. The railroad company continues to operate 
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the trunk line on 400 West Street (formerly 300 West Street) and 
to serve spur tracks to properties adjoining 400 West Street 
including a spur exiting on 700 South to serve properties east of 
400 West. 
10. Someone removed a portion of the spur track from 
[Hoopiiana's] property without his knowledge or consent and also 
removed a small portion of the track which was situated on 
[Williams'] property in the vicinity of [Hoopiiana1s] property. 
The remaining portion of the spur track on the [Williams'] 
property extending to 700 South Street is still in place. 
Williams' Statement of Facts includes some of the evidence 
presented and some of the facts set forth in the Findings of Fact 
of the trial court. However, Williams have not undertaken the 
burden of marshalling all of the evidence to render the findings 
of the trial court clearly erroneous. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The findings of the trial court must stand in absence of a 
marshalling of evidence which would show the findings to be 
clearly erroneous. 
There were two written easements over Williams' track. The 
first, in 1917 was a grant to a railroad for a divided spur, one 
of which served Hoopiiana's tract on the east, and the other 
extended southerly to other properties and the easement was 
stated to become "null and void" upon removal of the spur track. 
The second written easement in 1947 was a right-of-way 
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appurtenant to the owner of Lot 6 in perpetuity with no provision 
for termination. Hoopiiana was a contract purchaser of his tract 
and required his seller to obtain the second easementf the 
separate, perpetual right-of-way for his tract, to prevent 
termination by act of a railroad. Utah Supreme Court decisions 
recognize that a right-of-way gained by conveyance may not be 
lost by non-use alone and that an intent to abandon must be 
evidenced by clear and convincing actions releasing the ownership 
and right of use and an intentional abandonment. Western Gateway 
Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977); Riter v. 
Cavias, 431 P.2d 788, 789 (Utah 1967). The trial court 
specifically stated that there has been no abandonment of the 
easement by Hoopiiana. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. WILLIAMS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE TO 
ADEQUATELY CHALLENGE THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS. 
Williams have failed to marshal all the evidence in support 
of the district court's findings and to demonstrate that viewing 
the evidence in light most favorable to the district court, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the findings. Utah appellate 
courts have consistently held that to challenge a trial court's 
findings, "an appellant must marshal all the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even 
viewing it in light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the findings. K. J. Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). While Williams 
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claim to accept the district court's findings of fact, Williams' 
arguments are inconsistent with the court's findings. Williams 
cannot argue inconsistently with the district court's findings 
without first engaging in the marshalling process. See Ohline 
Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). 
Therefore, this court should assume that the record supports the 
district court's findings entirely. See id. 
POINT II. HOOPIIANA'S EASEMENT WAS ACQUIRED INDEPENDENTLY 
FROM A PREVIOUS EASEMENT AND WAS NOT CONDITIONAL IN ANY WAY 
TO THE 1917 EASEMENT OF THE RAILROAD. 
This case involves two distinctly different easements. The 
April 6, 1917 easement, Exhibit 1 (R 119), was to a railroad for 
a divided spur, one of which served Hoopiiana's tract in Lot 6 to 
the east and the other continued to serve other properties to the 
south. Exhibit 1, is the same as Exhibit A appended to Williams' 
brief. The 1917 easement provided for termination upon removal 
of any portion of the track and in fact the railroad filed a 
disclaimer in 1988 terminating the 1917 easement. The 1947 
Agreement Creating Right of Way to Lot 6 was appurtenant to the 
owner of Lot 6 and runs with the land and made no provision for 
termination but provided the owner of Lot 5 with the "right and 
privilege of changing the right-of-way for said spur track or 
other spur tracks to meet her convenience" provided that the 
changed right-of-way "continue to serve" Lot 6 and "to permit 
said [changed] spur track to enter the property of the party of 
8 
the second part at the same place as said spur track now enters 
the property of said party of the second part." [Emphasis added]. 
The last paragraph of the 1947 easement makes the right-of-way an 
appurtenance by stating that it is for the exclusive use of the 
"real property of said party of the second part." The 1947 
easement is Exhibit 2 in the record (R 0121) and is designated 
Exhibit B in Williams' brief. 
Hoopiiana testified that he acquired the property in 1946 (R 
149) and required his seller to provide him a separate easement 
and that he received the 1947 Easement, Exhibit 2. (R 0159). 
The 1947 easement differs from the 1917 easement in several 
respects, the most notable ones being: 
(a) The 1947 easement recites that it "grants and conveys 
to said party of the second part a right-of-way over the real 
property above described of said parties of the first part [Lot 
5] for a perpetual right-of-way of a spur track crossing said 
property of the said party of the first part to serve and for the 
use and benefit of the above described real property of the party 
of the second part" [West 1/2 Lot 6]. 
Whereas the 1917 easement was granted to the Oregon Short 
Line Railroad Company ("OSLR") solely for its two spur tracks 
over a definitely described center line of a right-of-way 8.5 
feet on either side of the center line. It was not given for use 
and benefit of any designated property and was to become null and 
void in the event any portion of the spur tracks were removed 
from the right-of-way described. 
9 
(b) The 1947 easement contained no provision for 
termination: While the recital in the 1947 document refers to a 
Union Pacific Railroad Company spur track, the granting 
provisions refer to "a perpetual right of way of a spur track" 
and allows the servient owner to change the location so long as 
the changed spur enters the dominant property at the same place 
as the existing spur enters the dominant property. Accordingly, 
if the servient owner elected to change the location, such change 
would appear to be the right and obligation of the servient 
owner, and not that of the dominant owner or the railroad. Also, 
if the railroad removed its spur track, the dominant owner is 
given a perpetual right to maintain "a spur track" which it could 
own or have anyone else own for its service. 
The 1947 easement was in no way conditional upon the 1917 
termination provision and to the contrary was given to avoid such 
kind of termination. 
POINT III. WHILE THE 1917 EASEMENT MAY BE CLASSIFIED AS A 
"SPECIFIC PURPOSE EASEMENT" SUBJECT TO TERMINATION, THE 1947 
EASEMENT WAS FOR THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF A PERPETUAL SPUR 
TRACK. 
Hoopiiana's easement for a perpetual spur track should be 
regarded as continuing for so long as the property could have 
some possible use of the spur track. In its findings of fact, 
the district court found that the 1947 easement is a perpetual 
right of way and not a specific purpose easement (R 104). 
Williams attempt to classify the 1947 right-of-way as a specific 
purpose easement dependent upon the 1917 easement in direct 
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contradiction to the district court's findings. The district 
court's determination that the 1947 right-of-way is perpetual 
indicates that the district court found no such condition. 
Specifically, the court found that "no such termination provision 
was contained in [Hoopiiana*s] easement of February 8, 1947, 
which by its terms was stated to be a perpetual right-of-way of a 
spur track crossing the property now owned by the [Williams] • . 
. ." (R 103-04). As established in POINT I abovef Williams may 
not challenge the district court's findings of fact without first 
marshalling the evidence. Therefore, this court should reject 
the following arguments offered by Williams that contradict the 
trial court's findings: 1) Hoopiiana's easement is conditional 
upon Williams' easement; 2) Hoopiiana's easement is a specific 
purpose easement; 3) the disclaimer of the easement by the 
railroad company terminated Hoopiiana's easement; and 4) the 
easement of April 6, 1917, and the right-of-way of February 8, 
1947, are sequential and are linked. 
Apparentlyf Williams are relying upon proof of abandonment 
in the arguments under their Points II through VI. 
POINT IV. THE COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE ABANDONMENT. 
Williams' complaint alleged a termination of the 1917 
easement by the railroad which Williams also claim terminated the 
1947 easement. There has never been a termination or disclaimer 
by Hoopiiana, the owner of the 1947 easement. 
Williams filed a motion for summary judgment (R 22), to 
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which Hoopiiana filed a memorandum in opposition thereto (R 43). 
In Williams' reply to Hoopiiana's memorandum, Williams denied 
that they were claiming "non-use" and repeated that the 1917 
termination provision applied to the 1947 agreement. 
Specifically, Williams replied: 
The Plaintiffs, by and through their 
attorney, Hollis S. Hunt, Reply to the 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as 
follows: 
1. THE ISSUE IS NOT ONE OF "NON-USE", 
BUT RATHER THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF 
"SPECIFIC PURPOSE". The Defendant cites the 
case of Western Gateway Storage Company v« 
Treseder, 567 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977), in which 
the Court talks about abandonment and non-
use of the right-of-way. However, the case 
before the Court here is not a question of 
"non-use" of a right of way by the owner of 
Lot 6. It is a question of the continued 
existence of the "subject matter" of the 
right of way, that is, the continued 
existence of the spur track. 
Williams' Reply Memorandum. 
At trial, Williams proffered evidence of abandonment but 
called no witnesses on such issue. Hoopiiana challenged the 
proffer and indicated that the complaint did not allege nonuse or 
abandonment (Tr 31 R 146). During the proffer, Williams' counsel 
was asked by the court what he would say was the abandoned date, 
to which counsel replied: "Oh, the date it was abandoned would be 
after the disclaimer by Union Pacific Railroad in 1988, shortly 
after the tracks were removed" (R 144). Hoopiiana called two 
witnesses to testify, beginning with Malualani Hoopiiana (R 149), 
and the plaintiff Richard Williams (R 168). Malualani Hoopiiana 
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testified that: 1) the spur track serving his property connected 
to the main line of 700 South just east of Fourth West (formerly 
300 West) (R 153); 2) the main tracks are still in the street 
and presently serve the newspaper agency every day; 3) Hoopiiana 
had service over the spur track in 1983 when he brought in a 
crane and used to ship hundreds of carloads of material on that 
track a year (Tr 40 R 155); 4) in 1984, Williams erected a gate 
at the 7 00 South entrance and Hoopiiana demanded and received a 
key to the gate from Mr. Williams (Tr 40 R 155) (Williams 
acknowledged that he gave Hoopiiana the key (Tr 56 R 171)); 5) 
while he was absent from the state for a few months, someone had 
stolen part of his spur track without his consent or knowledge 
and a portion of the spur remains on his land (Tr 41 R156); 6) 
he has previous experience with both the Union Pacific and D & RG 
railroads on four occasions where he arranged for spur track 
connection with them (Tr 45 R 160); and 7) Hoopiiana's tenantf 
Gene Pugmire expressed an interest in bringing in new steel in 
maintaining the railroad easement (Tr 49 R 0164). 
Mr. Richard Williams was called to testify by Hoopiiana, and 
he stated: 1) he acquired the property in Lot 5 in the early 
1970's (Tr 54 R 169); 2) he knew of the two easements of 1917 
and 1947 as shown in his title policy (Tr 55 R 170); 3) in 1984, 
he was asked to remove the gate he had placed at the 700 South 
entrance to the easement, and as a result provided Hoopiiana with 
a key to the gate (Tr 56 R 171); and 4) that he had negotiated 
to purchase the right-of-way from Hoopiiana in 1986. 
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In shortf Williams failed to allege abandonment of the 
right-of-way in their pleadings and offered no testimony 
regarding abandonment at trial. Hoopiiana's objection to 
Williams' proferred testimony regarding abandonment supports the 
trial court's determination that there was no abandonment of the 
1947 spur track easement. Therefore, this court should uphold 
the trial court's conclusion that there was no abandonment. 
POINT V. TEMPORARY NONUSE IS NOT ABANDONMENT. 
Temporary nonuse of the right-of-way is no more evidence of 
abandonment than is temporary nonuse of a vacant lot or building. 
The cases holding railroad easements to be abandoned by 
nonuse, deal with easements in gross. An easement in gross is a 
mere personal interest in or right to use the land of another 
which is not attached to a dominant estate. 25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Easements and Licenses Section 12. Earnst v. Allen, 55 Utah 272f 
277, 184 P. 821f 830 (1919) . 
The 1947 Agreement created an easement appurtenant wherein 
Hoopiiana's land is the dominant estate and the Williams' land is 
the servient estate. 
Utah follows the general rule stated in 25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Easements and Licenses Sec. 105: "As a general rule, an easement 
acquired by grant or reservation cannot be lost by mere nonuse 
for any length of timef no matter how great." See Riter v. 
Cavias, 431 P.2d 788, 789 (Utah 789). 
In Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P2d 181 
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(Utah 1977) the Utah Supreme Court held that Treseder had a right 
of way by grant, which was initially used for delivery of coal. 
After natural gas replaced coal, the way was used to remove 
wastef delivery of building materials and movement of tenants. 
Even though the way had for some time become littered with 
rubbish, power poles, mounds of earth and growing trees, it was 
held that there was no evidence of any intention to abandon the 
way. The following excerpts from the decision are pertinent: 
It is well recognized that an easement or right of 
way may be abandoned. However, to determine the issue 
of abandonment several factors need be considered among 
which are whether or not the right was acquired by 
prescription or grant, the extent of its use, and the 
actual intent of the owner. 
This court has previously recognized that a right 
gained by conveyance may not be lost by non-use alone 
and that an actual intent to abandon be evident. The 
same principle was reaffirmed in Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 
126 P. 959, 964-65 and in Riter v. Cavias, 431 P.2d 
788, 789. 
In regard to the quantum of proof required on the 
issue of abandonment, the court was confronted with the 
question in connection with a prescriptive easement in 
Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762 and it was therein 
determined that the degree of proof required was that 
of clear and convincing actions releasing the ownership 
and right of use and an intentional abandonment, not a 
mere preponderance of the evidence. 
The facts of the case at hand reveal that the right 
of way is of long standing, is supported by a grant, 
and the evidence presented of actual intent to abandon 
was insufficient. While the evidence does reflect the 
right of way is somewhat obstructed by debris, 
undergrowth and items of personal property, there is 
clear evidence that it was used, is presently in a 
condition as will allow continued use, and that 
defendants have access thereto through a portion of 
removable fence utilized as a gate. In fact, the trial 
court made a specific finding of occasional use. 
The trial court further found that defendants would 
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suffer onljf slight inconvenience should the right of 
way be closed while on the other hand plaintiff would 
suffer substantial monetary loss if the same remained 
open. 
In light of the specific findings of the court, which 
are contrairy to a determination of abandonment, and in 
derogation of the previously announced principles of 
law pertaining to abandonment of granted rights of way, 
we reverse eand rule as a matter of law that the right 
of way was not abandoned and remand for the entry of 
judgment im favor of defendants. No cost awarded. 
Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 
1977) (emphasis added). 
Although Williams did not allege in their complaint that the 
Hoopiiana had ah/andoned the right-of-way granted in 1947, and in 
Williams' Reply to Hoopiiana's Objection to Motion for Summary 
Judgment stated "However, the case before the Court here is not a 
question of vnom-usef of a right-of-way by the owner of Lot 6," 
at trial, Williams endeavored to rely primarily upon an issue of 
abandonment. Wi-lliams rely upon the Texas case of Kearney & Son 
v. Fancher, 401 S.W.2d 897 (1966). The Kearney case was one in 
which the contiimiation of the easement was an "impossibility". 
The "impossibility" in that case was the result of the Blue 
Diamond Company" <s acquisition of property north of the subject 
tracts, and the jnotification of Blue Diamond that it was closing 
off such connecting switch track crossing their property and that 
it would no longter allow railroad cars to cross its property. Id. 
at 902. The court stated that the action of Blue Diamond 
effectively cut off all railroad car access to the switch track 
in question. Jd. at 902-03. 
No such impossibility exists in the case before this Court. 
16 
There is a main railroad track along the center of 400 West 
(formerly 300 West) and a spur track exiting the main line at the 
intersection of 400 West and 700 South which presently runs to 
the northeast serving the Newspaper Agency. Hoopiiana has his 
own right-of-way over the Williams' property which extends to the 
south line of 700 south street and is less than 100 feet from 
where the spurs joined in the intersection of 400 West and 700 
South. Utah statutes requiring the railroad corporation to make 
connections and provide services by switches and spurs are 
appended to this brief and cited as Utah Code Annotated §§ 54-3-
20 and 54-4-11. Accordingly, upon application of Hoopiiana, his 
successors or assigns the spur track service is provided by law. 
Williams also cite the Kansas case of Gauges v. State of 
Kansas, 815 P.2d 501 (1991) wherein the easement was granted to 
the railroad, not the abutting owner and the railroad abandoned 
its right-of-way by disclaimer. In Gauges, there was no dispute 
on the issue of abandonment by the railroad. See id at 503. The 
trial court cited a prior Kansas abandonment decision, Miller v. 
St. Louis, Southwestern Rv. Co., 718 P.2d 610 (1986) which held: 
Whether a right-of-way has been abandoned by a railroad 
company is largely a question of intent, and it is 
generally held that in order to constitute an 
abandonment there must be an intent to relinquish, 
together with external acts by which the intent is 
carried into effect. 
Id. at 613 (quoting Pratt v. Griese, 409 P.2d 777, 780-781 (Utah 
1966)) . 
The Miller court found no abandonment by the railroad which 
17 
had previously used a tract within its operating right-of-way to 
service its livestock pens, but phased this out in 1967, allowing 
debris from demolished buildings and fences to litter the tract 
and tall weeds to take over. Miller, 718 P.2d at 613. In 1969, 
Miller cleared the debris, placed permanent steel bolts on the 
boundary lines, and planted alfalfa, trees, a garden and stored 
equipment on the operating right-of-way tract. Id. Although 
Miller claimed that the railroad had not used the tract between 
1968 and 1984, the court found no abandonment where an official 
of the railroad testified unequivocally that the railroad never 
had intent to abandon the property. Ld. In addition to the 
above quotation, the Kansas court cited 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements 
and Licenses Section 103 specifying that the intent must be 
neither to use nor to retake the property and the act must be 
clear and unmistakable manifesting a purpose to repudiate and 
indicating a lack of interest in the property. Id. 
By contrast, Hoopiiana testified that he had no intention of 
abandoning his right-of-way even though the railroad disclaimed 
its 1917 easement. He further testified that he used the spur in 
1983 and that in 1984 he demanded and received a key from 
Williams to the gate erected by Williams. Williams acknowledged 
giving the key to Hoopiiana, and that in 1986 he negotiated 
unsuccessfully to buy Hoopiiana's right-of-way. Hoopiiana 
further testified that the trackage on part of his land was taken 
up without his consent or knowledge when he was in Hawaii and 
that he and his present tenant are contemplating reactivating the 
18 
line. 
In short, Hoopiiana did not abandon his easement. Under 
Utah law, temporary nonuse alone is not abandonment. Treseder, 
567 P.2d at 182; Riter, 431 P.2d at 789; Tuttle, 126 P. 959. To 
show abandonment, Williams must prove that Hoopiiana*s clear and 
convincing actions releasing ownership and right of use manifest 
an intentional abandonment. See Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 
762, 766 (Utah 1962). Williams failed to carry this burden at 
trial. In fact, the evidence Hoopiiana presented at trial 
clearly indicates that Hoopiiana did not abandon his easement. 
Therefore, this court should affirm the district court's 
conclusion that Hoopiiana did not abandon his easement. 
POINT VI. THE 1917 EASEMENT WAS TERMINABLE AT THE ELECTION 
OF THE RAILROAD, WHEREAS THE 1947 EASEMENT COULD BE 
TERMINATED ONLY BY THE DOMINANT OWNER. 
The 1917 easement was not granted to the owner of any 
property served by the easement, but was an easement in gross to 
the railroad to render service at the election of the railroad. 
The land owners under the 1917 easement were given no right to 
have the divided spur removed or continued. By contrast, the 
1947 Agreement Creating Right of Way was a grant and conveyance 
to the landowner in perpetuity for the exclusive use of the owner 
of the West one-half of Lot 6. 
Accordingly, any act by the railroad company in terminating 
its own easement or terminating service does not constitute a 
termination of the perpetual right-of-way of Hoopiiana and his 
19 
statutory right to require service over the spur. 
CONCLUSION 
Hoopiiana is the owner of a right-of-way appurtenant to his 
dominant estate which was acquired by grant stated to be of 
perpetual duration without mention of termination or abandonment. 
Hoopiiana's right to construct, maintain, operate and use the 
right-of-way for a spur track or equivalent use continues 
irrespective of temporary nonuse. The specific written 
abandonment by the railroad of its easement in gross under the 
1917 Easement in no way applies to the continued easement 
appurtenant of Hoopiiana under the 1947 agreement. Therefore, 
the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
Dated this 1 7 day of March, 1994. 
I certify I mailed two copies hereof to Mr. Hollis S. Hunt, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this / 7 day of March, 19$4. 
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54-4-10 PUBLIC UTILITIES 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 4, § 8; C.L. 
1917, § 4805; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-4-9. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads § 10903(a), of Interstate Commerce Commis-
§ 335 et seq. sion's decision permitting railroad to abandon 
C.J.S. — 74 C.J S. Railroads § 418. line or discontinue service, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 231. 
A.L.R. — Propriety, under 49 USCS Key Numbers. — Railroads <s=» 227. 
54-4-10. Connections between tracks — Adjustment of ex-
pense. 
Whenever the commission shall find that public convenience and necessity 
would be subserved by having connections made between the tracks of any 
two or more railroad or street railroad corporations so that cars may readily 
be transferred from one to the other at any of the points hereinafter in this 
section specified, the commission may order any two or more such corpora-
tions owning, controlling, operating or managing tracks of the same gauge to 
make physical connections at any and all crossings, and at all points where a 
railroad or street railroad shall begin or terminate or run near to any other 
railroad or street railroad. After the necessary franchise or permit has been 
secured from the county, city or town the commission may likewise order such 
physical connection within such county, city or town between two or more 
railroads which enter the limits of the same. The commission shall by order 
direct whether the expense of the connections referred to in this section shall 
be borne jointly or otherwise. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 4, § 9; C.L. 
1917, § 4800; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-4-10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
P o w e r of municipal i t ies . a railroad could not occupy any of the streets of 
F ranch i ses . a c^y without the consent of its governing 
This section recognizes the power of munici- body. Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
palities to grant franchises, because it appears 103 Utah 186, 134 P.2d 469 (1943). 
therefrom that before the adoption of this title, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 65 Am. Jur . 2d Railroads C.J.S. — 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 56. 
§ 258. Key Numbers. — Railroads <s=> 214 et seq. 
54-4-11. Spurs and switching service. 
(1) Whenever the commission shall find that application has been made by 
any person to a railroad corporation for a connection or spur as provided in 
Section 54-3-20, and that the railroad corporation has refused to provide such 
connection or spur and that the applicant is entitled to have the same pro-
vided for him under said Section 54-3-20, the commission shall make an order 
requiring the providing of such connection or spur and the maintenance and 
use of the same upon reasonable terms which the commission shall have 
power to prescribe. Whenever such connection or spur has been so provided 
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any person shall be entitled to connect with the private track, tracks or rail-
road thereby connected with the railroad of the railroad corporation, and to 
use the same or to use the spur so provided upon payment to the person 
incurring the primary expense of such private track, tracks or railroad, or the 
connection therewith or of such spur, of a reasonable proportion of the cost 
thereof, to be determined by the commission after notice to the interested 
parties and a hearing thereon; provided, that such connection and use can be 
made without unreasonable interference with the rights of the person incur-
ring such primary expense. 
(2) The commission shall likewise have the power to require any railroad 
corporation to switch to private spurs and industrial tracks upon its own 
railroad the cars of a connecting railroad corporation, and to prescribe the 
terms and compensation for such service. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 4, § 10; C.L. Cross-References. — Interchange of ser-
1917, § 4807; R.S. 1933 & C. 1043, 76-4-11. vice required, Utah Const, Art XII, Sec. 12. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 65 Am Jin 2d Railioads C.J.S. — 74 C J S Railroads § 412. 
^ 205 to 218 Key Numbers. — Railroads <£= 216. 
54-4-12. Telegraph and telephone — Connections — Joint 
rates — Division of costs. 
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that a physical con-
nection can reasonably be made between the lines of two or more telephone 
corporations, or two or more telegraph corporations, whose lines can be made 
to form a continuous line of communication by the construction and mainte-
nance of suitable connections for the transfer of messages or conversations, 
and that public convenience and necessity will be subserved thereby, or shall 
find that two or more telegraph or telephone corporations have failed to estab-
lish joint rates, tolls or charges for service by or over their said lines and tha t 
joint rates, tolls or charges ought to be established, the commission may, by 
its order, require that such connection be made, except where the purpose of 
such connection is primarily to secure the transmission of local messages or 
conversations between points within the same city or town, and that conversa-
tions be transmitted and messages transferred over such connections under 
such rules and regulations as the commission may establish and prescribe, 
and that through lines and joint rates, tolls and charges be made and be used, 
observed and be in force in the future. If such telephone or telegraph corpora-
tions do not agree upon the division between themselves of the cost of such 
physical connection or connections, or upon the division of the joint rates, tolls 
or charges established by the commission over such through lines, the com-
mission shall have authority, after a further hearing, to establish such divi-
sion by supplemental order. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 4, § 11; C.L. 
1917, § 4808; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-4-12. 
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by the commission to charge less for a longer than for a shorter distance 
service for the transportation of passengers or property or for the transmission 
of messages or conversations, and the commission may from time to time 
prescribe the extent to which such common carrier, telegraph or telephone 
corporation may be relieved from the operation and requirements of this sec-
tion. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 3, § 11; C.L. 
1917, § 4793; L. 1919 (S.S.), ch. 13, § 1; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 76-3-19. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect of federal Transportation Act. provisions of federal Transportation Act of 
Long and short haul provision of this section 1920 Wasatch Coal Co v. Baldwin, 60 Utah 
was suspended and rendered inoperative by 397, 208 P. 1109 (1922). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am J u r 2d Carriers Key Numbers. - - Carriers c= 12(2), 12(3); 
$ 119 Telecommunications c=^  323. 
C.J.S. — 13 C . JS Carriers * 295, 582 
54-3-20. Railroad connections by switches and spurs. 
(1) Every railroad corporation, upon the application of any corporation or 
person being a shipper or receiver or contemplated shipper or receiver of 
freight for a connection between the railroad of such railroad corporation and 
any existing or contemplated private track, tracks or railroad of such corpora-
tion or person, shall make such connection and provide such switches and 
tracks as may be necessary for that purpose, and deliver and receive cars 
thereover; provided, that such connection is reasonably practicable and can be 
installed and used without materially increasing the hazard of the operation 
of the railroad with which such connection is sought, and that business which 
may reasonably be expected to be received by such railroad corporation over 
such connection is sufficient to justify the expense of such connection to such 
railroad corporation. 
(2) Under the conditions specified in the proviso in Subsection (1) hereof, 
every railroad corporation, upon the application of any person being a shipper 
or receiver or contemplated shipper or receiver of freight, shall construct upon 
its right of way a spur or spurs for the purpose of receiving and delivering 
freight thereby, and shall receive and deliver freight thereby. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 3, § 12; C.L. 
1917, § 4794; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-3-20. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 65 Am. Jur . 2d Railroads C.J.S. — 74 C.J S. Railroads § 413. 
§ 205 et seq. Key Numbers. — Railroads «=» 216, 225. 
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ATTORNEVFOR Defendant 
1TO WBMT FOURTH Botrrii 
B O I N T I F U L , U T A H H4O10 
TELEPHONE: 2Ba-24£l 
Thiro Judicial District 
JUL 0 6 1993 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN WILLIAMS, and KYLE 
ANN WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MALUALANI B. HOOPIIANA, 
Trustee of the MALUALANI B. 
HOOPIIANA TRUST, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 92090600QPR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
This cause came on regularly for trial before the above 
entitled Court on May 27, 1993, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff, Steven Williams, appeared 
in person and by his attorney Hollis S. Hunt. Defendant appeared 
in person and by his attorney, George K. Fadel Plaintiffs7 
attorney proffered the testimony and evidence of the plaintiffs; 
Defendant testified and called the plaintiff Steven Williams as a 
witness; the Court took the matter under advisement, reviewed the 
briefs presented by the parties, and being fully advised in the 
matter now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiffs are residents of Salt Lake County and are 
1 
owners of certain real property located at 737 South 300 West, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and more particularly described as 
follows: 
Lot 5, Block 23, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, as is 
recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
2. The defendant is the owner of the following described 
tract which adjoins the plaintiffs' property on the east thereof: 
West one-half of Lot 6, Block 12, Plat "A", Salt Lake 
City Survey, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
3. On or about April 6, 1917, the then owner of Lot 5, 
referred to above, Theodore T. Burton and Florence Burton, his 
wife, granted to the Oregon Shortline Railroad Company a railroad 
easement for a right-of-way for the construction, operation and 
maintenance of a railroad spur that traversed through all of Lot 
5, as per Exhibit "A" offered and received in evidence. 
4. A condition of the said Easement of April 6, 1917, 
granted by the previous owner of Lot 5 was that: 
If at any time the said spur track or any portion 
thereof shall be removed from the above-described land, 
then and in that event this conveyance shall become 
null and void and have no affect between the parties 
hereto or their successors, or assigns, as to such 
trackage so removed. 
5. Subsequently, on or about February 8, 1947, the then 
owner of Lot 5, Florence M. Burton, granted to the then owner of 
the following real property; 
The West 1/2 of Lot 6, Block 12, Plat "A" Salt Lake 
City Survey. 
a right-of-way for a spur track in perpetuity. The right-of-way 
was granted for the exclusive use of the real property as a "spur 
2 
track" and could not be extended to any other property adjacent 
to the west half of Lot 6, Block 12, Plat "A", Salt Lake City 
Survey. Said Easement of February 8, 1947 was received into 
evidence as Exhibit B. 
6. The successor-in-interest to Edward L. Burton, the 
Grantee of the right-of-way for a railroad spur over the 
plaintiff's tract is the defendant who is the current owner and 
in possession of certain real property at about 349 West 700 
South, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah and is the 
West 1/2 of Lot 6, Block 12, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey. 
7. On or about July 6, 1983, the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, the Lessee of the railroad spur across Lot 5 notified 
the plaintiffs, who are now the owners of Lot 5, of their Notice 
of Intent to Terminate the Easement of April 6, 1917, that was 
originally granted to the railroad company for the creation of 
the railroad spur track. 
Then, on December 17, 1987, the Union Pacific Railroad for 
and in behalf of the Oregon Shortline Railroad Company, recorded 
a Disclaimer releasing all of their rights, title and interest to 
the Easement of April 6, 1917. Said Disclaimer of December 17, 
1987, was granted based upon the original terms of the railroad 
spur Easement of April 6, 1917, which stated: 
If at any time the said spur tracks, or any portion 
thereof shall be removed from the above-described land, 
then in the event this conveyance shall become null and 
void and if no effect between the parties thereto or 
their successors or assigns as to such trackage so 
removed. 
No such termination provision was contained in the defendant's 
3 
easement of February 18, 1947, which by its terms was stated to 
be a perpetual right-of-way of a spur track crossing the property 
now owned by the plaintiffs, with the right of the servient owner 
to change the location on its tract so long as the right-of-way 
as changed will continue to permit the spur track to continue to 
serve the defendant's property entering at the same place as the 
existing spur then entered the dominant tract, 
8. The defendant last used the spur track in 1983. 
Subsequently in 1983, plaintiffs erected a gate at the entrance 
of the spur at 700 South Street, placed a lock on the gate and 
provided a key to the gate to the defendant. 
9. In 1988 the Union Pacific Railroad removed that portion 
of the spur in 700 South Street which attached to the trunk line 
on 400 West street thereby disconnecting the spur at the vicinity 
of plaintiffs' tact. The railroad company continues to operate 
the trunk line on 400 West street (formerly 300 West Street) and 
to serve spur tracks to properties adjoining 400 West street 
including a spur exiting on 700 South to serve properties east of 
400 West. 
10. Someone removed a portion of the spur track from the 
defendant's property without his knowledge or consent and also 
removed a small portion of the track which was situated on 
plaintiffs' property in the vicinity of the defendant's property. 
The remaining portion of the spur track on the plaintiff's 
property extending to 700 South Street is still in place. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the 
4 
follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant is the owner of a perpetual easement for 
the spur track over the property of the plaintiffs which was 
obtained by written, recorded grant and which was not conditioned 
upon any specific purpose associated with the spur track easement 
of 1917 granted to the railroad company. 
2. There has been no abandonment of the spur track easement 
of 1947 which was granted to the defendants and the same 
continues as an easement appurtenant to defendant's property over 
and across the property of the plaintiffs. 
3. Defendant is entitled to a judgment dismissing the 
plaintiff's compliant with prejudice and decreeing that the 
defendant's easement of February 8, 1947, continues in full force 
and effect. 
DATED this (* day of Ll/^~'}> , 1993. 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 22nd day of June, 1993, I mailed 
copies of the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment and Decree to Mr. Hollis S. Hunt, attorney for 
plaintiffs, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
/ / / / 
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Defendant 
Tn/d Judicial District 
JUL 0 6 1993 
/J- Ga^wi^^= Cx-t>0!brk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN WILLIAMS, and KYLE 
ANN WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MALUALANI B. HOOPIIANA, 
Trustee of the MALUALANI B. 
HOOPIIANA TRUST, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
AND 
DECREE 
<9\%4St>S 
Civil No. 920906000PR 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
This cause came on regularly for trial before the above 
entitled Court on May 27, 1993, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff, Steven Williams, appeared 
in person and by his attorney Hollis S. Hunt. Defendant appeared 
in person and by his attorney, George K. Fadel. Plaintiffs' 
attorney proffered the testimony and evidence of the plaintiffs; 
Defendant testified and called the plaintiff Steven Williams as a 
witness; the Court took the matter under advisement, reviewed the 
briefs presented by the parties, and being fully advised in the 
matter and the Court having heretofore made and entered Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1 
1. That the plaintiffs7 complaint be, and the same is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. That the defendant is the owner of a perpetual easement 
for a spur track appurtenant to the West one-half of Lot 6, Block 
12, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey in Salt Lake County, Utah 
over and across the property of the plaintiffs described as Lot 
5, Block 12, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, by Agreement Creating Right Of Way dated February 8, 1947, 
and recorded June 16, 1947, in Book 543 at Page 436, in the 
office of the Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, which has not 
been abandoned and which continues in full force and effect. 
DATED this day of 1}/C~^)m- / 1993. 
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